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so than now. Applicants can and should use every advantage at their disposal to obtain a job which is
rewarding, financially and otherwise. While this author believes a math major gives applicants many
advantages as they search for their dream job, one often overlooked is the ability to strategize and schedule
their interviews to maximize the chance of landing that job.
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Searching for a job is always stressful and, with unemployment rates at their highest
levels in years, never more so than now. Applicants can and should use every advantage
at their disposal to obtain a job which is rewarding, financially and otherwise. While
this author believes a math major gives applicants many advantages as they search for
their dream job, one often overlooked is the ability to strategize and schedule their
interviews to maximize the chance of landing that job.
The secretary problem helps an employer find the optimal candidate for a job out of
a large pool of applicants. The set up is as follows: only one person can be hired, and,
for any pair of applicants, the employer has a strict preference for one of them that
they can discern after seeing both. However, after each interview the employer must
either accept or reject the candidate. If the candidate is the final person, the interviewer
simply must accept them, as rejected candidates cannot be recalled. In the classical
formulation of the problem, the goal is to select the best applicant overall.
What strategy can the employer use to maximize the probability of hiring the best
overall applicant? It is clear that, other than the final candidate, you only hire an ap-
plicant if they are the best applicant you have seen to that point. Otherwise you are
certainly not hiring the best person. It follows that the best strategy is to reject an ini-
tial number of candidates and then hire the first candidate who is better than everyone
seen so far. With a little work, one can show that if you know there will be a total of
n candidates, where n is large, then you should initially reject k ≈ n
e
candidates. For
a proof, see [3]. A more recent article discussing this problem and its implications for
students’ dating lives can be found in [6].
While there is some uncertainty regarding the origin of this problem, its first pub-
lished appearance was in Martin Gardner’s Mathematical Games column in February
of 1960 (reprinted in [2]). A detailed history of the secretary problem and other clas-
sical stopping problems is in [1].
The secretary problem is an outstanding example of how a seed planted by one
of Gardner’s columns has grown and flourished. Over the intervening half-century,
people have studied many variants. For example, how does the answer change if the
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interviewer is allowed to recall the last few applicants [7]? Or what if there is a full
committee of interviewers rather than a single interviewer [4]? Or how should one
deal with the costs of interviewing and pressures to hire an early applicant to reduce
costs [5]? As of this writing, there are over 130 papers in MathSciNet referring to the
Secretary Problem and its extensions.
Almost all published variants look at the problem from the employer’s perspective.
At a recent senior thesis presentation on one such variant at Gettysburg College, an-
other senior, clearly concerned about his own job prospects, asked “What does this
mean for applicants? If I know that an employer is going to behave optimally, when
should I schedule my interview?” This is the question we examine here.
When rank is unknown
First we consider the situation of an applicant who has no idea how strong they are
compared to the rest of the pool. Throughout this note, we assume that there are n
applicants for a single job, and that the employer’s strategy is initially to reject the
first k and then hire the first subsequent candidate who is better than all candidates
already seen, if such a candidate exists, or the final candidate otherwise. We call this the
optimal strategy. We assume that all n! possible ordered rankings of the n candidates
are equally likely and examine the probability that each position in the interview order
is the one where the chosen applicant is found.
Let us define the random variable X to be the interview position of the applicant who
is finally chosen. Using the optimal strategy, the employer rejects the first k applicants,
and therefore P(X = i) = 0 if 1 ≤ i ≤ k. In order for the (k + 1)st candidate to be
chosen, they must be better than all the candidates in the rejected group. This occurs
exactly when the (k + 1)st candidate is the best among the first k + 1 candidates, which
occurs with probability 1k+1 . More generally, for k + 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, the i th candidate
will be chosen if and only if:
• The i th candidate is the best of the first i candidates.
• The best of the first i − 1 candidates is in the initial rejected group of k candidates.
The second condition ensures that we get to the i th candidate without choosing some-
one else; the first condition ensures that we then choose the i th candidate. The proba-
bility of these two conditions simultaneously holding is 1i · ki−1 .
Finally, there are two separate situations in which the last candidate is selected:
either the best candidate overall was in the initial group of rejected candidates, in
which case the final candidate is chosen as a last resort, or the best overall candidate
is the last one interviewed and the second best candidate was in the initial group of
rejectees. The first scenario occurs with probability k
n
; the second with probability
1
n
· k
n−1 . Adding these two cases together, P(X = n) = kn + kn(n−1) = kn−1 . In summary,
we have the following result.
Theorem 1. The probability that the i th candidate is chosen is
P(i) =

0 if i ≤ k,
k
i(i−1) if k < i < n,
k
n−1 if i = n.
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The goal of the applicant is to obtain interview slot i which maximizes P(i). Note
that ki(i−1) is a decreasing function in i . Therefore the candidate should target the
(k + 1)st slot or the final slot, depending on whether 1k+1 or kn−1 is larger. An applicant
will prefer the final slot if k
n−1 >
1
k+1 . This is the case when
k >
−1+√4n − 3
2
, (1)
agreeing with the intuition that rejecting a larger number of candidates makes it more
likely that the best candidate is in the rejected group and that the employer accepts the
final candidate.
If the employer uses the optimal strategy with k = n
e
, then the applicant must check
whether (1) holds, which happens when k2 + (1− e)k + 1 > 0. A simple calculation
shows this is always the case, and therefore the candidate should choose to be inter-
viewed in the final slot if they have no information about their relative standing with the
other candidates. Of course, n
e
is never an integer, so in reality the employer chooses
either k = b n
e
c or d n
e
e. In the latter case, the candidate will still wish to choose the
final interview slot, because if n
e
> −1+
√
4n−3
2 then certainly d ne e is as well. If the em-
ployer rounds down then one can check that the candidate will be better off choosing
last as long as k > 2.5. In particular, being interviewed in the final position is optimal
if n ≥ 10. One can manually check that, if the interviewer is going to reject k = b n
e
c
applicants, one will be no worse off being interviewed last except when n = 4, 5, or 8.
Thus we have proved
Theorem 2. If the number of applicants to a position is at least nine and an em-
ployer uses the optimal strategy then the probability that they hire the final person
interviewed is higher than any other person.
When rank is known
On the whole, in the absence of information about their standing, a candidate should
choose to be interviewed last. This is also true if you know you are the worst candidate,
as you will never be better than all the candidates in the rejected group, so you can only
be chosen if you are the last resort. On the other hand, if you know you are the strongest
candidate, then you prefer the (k + 1)st slot over all others. You are then guaranteed
to be chosen: you are certainly better than anyone in the rejected group, and in any
later slot there is a chance that someone else is picked before you are interviewed. In
general, then, it seems that stronger applicants want to be interviewed early and weaker
applicants later. In this section, we prove that this is so by considering the point of view
of a candidate who knows they are the j th best in a pool of n candidates.
Assume first that our candidate interviews last. As in the previous section, if j 6= 1
then the only way that they can be chosen is if the best candidate is in the rejected
group, which happens with probability k
n−1 , since there are n − 1 slots remaining for
the best applicant to be in, all equally likely. On the other hand, if j = 1 then the only
way to be chosen from the last slot is if the second best candidate is rejected, which
also happens with probability k
n−1 . In other words, the probability that the candidate in
the final slot is chosen is k
n−1 independent of how strong they are.
As before, if a candidate is interviewed in slot i , k < i < n, they will be chosen if
and only if they are the best candidate seen so far and the second best candidate to that
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point is rejected. Assume that i > 1, which will is the case as long as k > 0, i.e., at
least one candidate is rejected. The probability that the j th best candidate overall is the
best candidate seen so far, when they are interviewed in the i th slot, is the probability
that all i − 1 candidates seen previously come from the n − j candidates who are
worse than them. This happens with probability (
n− j
i−1)
(n−1i−1)
. Moreover, the probability that
the best candidate seen before the i th slot was in the rejected group is ki−1 . Putting this
together, we get the following result:
Theorem 3. Assume the j th best candidate is interviewed in the i th slot. The prob-
ability of getting chosen is:
Pj (i) =

0 if i ≤ k,
(n− ji−1)
(n−1i−1)
k
i−1 if k < i < n,
k
n−1 if i = n.
Again, Pj (i) is a decreasing function in the range k < i < n. Explicitly, we note
that if i and i + 1 are in this range, then
Pj (i)
Pj (i + 1) =
(
n− j
i−1
)(
n−1
i−1
) k
i − 1
(
n−1
i
)(
n− j
i
) i
k
= (n − i)! (n − i − j)!
(n − i − 1)! (n − i − j + 1)!
i
i − 1
= n − i
n − i − j + 1
i
i − 1 > 1,
and therefore Pj (i) > Pj (i + 1), as desired. This means that for any fixed value of j ,
an applicant should either choose to be interviewed in the k + 1st slot or in the nth slot.
In order to see which of these options gives the higher probability, we must compare
Pj (k + 1) = (
n− j
k )
(n−1k )
with Pj (n) = kn−1 . After some algebraic manipulation, we find that
Pj (k + 1) > Pj (n) if and only if
(
n− j
k
)
>
(
n−2
k−1
)
. We wish to consider this inequality
separately for different values of j .
If j = 1, then we compare (n−1k ) to (n−2k−1). Since (n−1k ) = (n−2k ) + (n−2k−1), the best
candidate will prefer to be interviewed in the (k + 1)st slot, as we argued earlier.
If j = 2, then we compare (n−2k ) and (n−2k−1). The former is larger exactly when k <
n−1
2 . If the employer chooses k ≈ n/e, then this holds for large values of k, implying
that the second best candidate should also choose the (k + 1)st slot.
If j = 3, then we compare (n−3k ) and (n−2k−1). Looking at the quotient of these terms
and expanding algebraically, we see that the former is larger exactly if
k2 + (5− 3n)k + (n2 − 3n + 2) > 0,
which occurs if k < 3n−5−
√
5n2−18n+17
2 . For large n, this is true if k <
3−√5
2 n ≈ .38n,
which is (barely) guaranteed if the employer chooses k = n/e ≈ .367n. More specif-
ically, one can work out that the third-best candidate should choose the (k + 1)st slot
for all cases except for 33 specific values of n, the largest of which is n = 98.
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For j ≥ 4, comparing (n− jk ) and (n−2k−1) is difficult. In particular, one can show that
the former term is greater exactly when
n − k − 1
k
j−2∏
`=1
n − k − `− 1
n − `− 1 > 1.
Assuming that n = ek and letting n be large, we see that this holds if and only if
(e−1) j−1
e j−2 ≥ 1, which is false for j ≥ 4. In particular, for sufficiently large n one prefers
to be interviewed last if ones ranking is fourth or worse. We summarize the preceding
results:
Theorem 4. If you are the j th best applicant then you want to be interviewed in the
(k + 1)st slot for j ≤ 3, and in the final slot if j ≥ 4 and n is sufficiently large.
We also note that for any n and j ≥ 3 and k > n− j2 we will have that
(
n−2
k−1
)
>(
n− j
k−1
) ≥ (n− jk ). If the employer sets k = d ne e then k will be greater than n− j2 if jn >
e−2
e
≈ .26. In particular, this says that regardless of n, if a candidate suspects they are
not in roughly the top quarter of candidates then they would prefer to be interviewed
in the last slot.
Final thoughts
Unless you are a truly extraordinary applicant, if your prospective employer uses the
classic strategy, then you should try to be interviewed last. However, attempting to
game the system is likely to backfire as there is no margin of error. Being the final
interviewee gives one the highest probability of being hired, but being the second-to-
last has one of the lowest! Students going on the job market should put their energy
into improving their resume´s rather than strategizing interview timing. We note that
a student can do both by generalizing our work to some of the variants of the sec-
retary problem mentioned earlier—and publishing their work in future issues of this
JOURNAL.
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Summary. A 1960 “Mathematical Games” column describes the problem, now known as the
Secretary Problem, which asks how someone interviewing candidates for a position should
maximize the chance of hiring the best applicant. This note looks at how an applicant should
respond, if they know the interviewer uses this optimal strategy. We show that all but the
very top applicants have the best chance of being hired if they arrange to be the last person
interviewed.
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Crossword Solution
(puzzle on pp. 70–71)
M A R T I N G A R D N E R
H I T T U N E E M I R A T E S
R E V E R S I R A C E T R A C K
E N S B E G S N E V E L A N
G O T H I C D I N I L O
B A S E C O L L O S T I T
A S P E C T S N A G S O Y A S
L E O H A H C I R C U S
M A T H E M A T I C A L G A M E S
O E U V R E B O A A N A
G H O S T E E R S P R O U T S
R E R E A D U G H K I S S
O R D H E X E I D E R S
O M I T J A N P E N A N I M
M I N O R A X I S F E M B O T S
T E L E V I S E O R B I T A L
E L E U S I S G O O G O L
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